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However, MCMC also added that investigation by the Celcos, or the Public Cellular Service (PCS) providers, revealed that there are mobile-originated (MOs) requested from the consumers' mobilephones to the short code belonging to the Celco's external Content Providers (CPs).

In layman's term, all those mobile users who claimed to have been scammed, and billed, have themselves to blame as the Celcos argued that it was the mobile users themselves who had requested, or purchased, such SMS-delivered content, particularly via the 3xxxx short code. The term MO refers to the operator lingo to mean Mobilephone-Originated request/purchase, The argument from the Celco's is taken to mean that NOBODY can make the decision to buy a CP's content/service except the mobile user who holds the 'scammed' handset.

To this, MCMC stated in April 9 letter that "IT IS POSSIBLE" that some unidentified parties could have generated fake MOs to LEGALLY subscribe subscribers, or initiate FAKE SUBSCRIBER REQUEST for its services via the international gateway -- bypassing the Celco's SMSC and onward to the ECPA/CMP for 'legitimate billing' that is shared between the Celco and the CP.

In the letter to the three CEOs, MCMC also expressed its grave concerns on this act of STEALING as many innocent subscribers as have been affected.

More importantly, MCMC emphasised that it is WORST for PREPAID SUBSCRIBERS who may have not realised that they are being charged since there is no itemised billing for cross-checking. (Screenshots understands that, at the moment, only DiGi provides online itemised billing for prepaid subscribers -- an industry practice for public accountability the Maxis and Celcom have hitherto failed to benchmark themselves against their smallest peer in Malaysia.)

It is understood that, prior to the April 9 letter, MCMC has held investigations and discussions with the Celcos and their CPs.

The immediate solution MCMC proposed is to prevent any Fake MOs and SMS Spoofing from recurring. As such, the Celcos and their CPs are to block incoming MOs from the International gateway to the 3xxxx short codes belonging to the CPs.

3xxxx & Short Code Masking

In the April 9 letter, MCMC also drew the attention of the three Celcos' CEOs to the issue of Short Code Masking.

For those unniitiated to the CPs' lingo, 'Short Code Masking' is a term used to describe the instance where a 5-digit short code such as 3xxxx, or a regular mobile phone number, is NOT displayed when a text message originating from this source is received on the mobilephone. Instead, the actual number is masked, or hidden, and is displayed as a word, or as a different number.

Currently, short code masking is possible where the CP sends the text message to a mobile customer using international gateway, added MCMC.

As such, MCMC said it has evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the CPs to mask their short codes. MCMC concluded that the potential of abuse is HIGH as it is difficult to detect fraudulent CPs.

How do the rogue CPs fraud the flaws in the Celco's SMS model, you may ask.

Oneof the ways, according to MCMC, is for a CP to abuse the ability to mask a short code, or a mobilephone number, by MASQUERADING AS ANOTHER CP and by sending damaging information in the text of themessage.

For mobile users, they will not be able to reply to a short code masked as a name and thus, you and I -- the mobile users -- will not be able to terminate a service nor will we be able to request the CP to stop sending us the so-called "marketing messages" by typing "STOP" or "OUT" respectively.

Now you see, how potent is the potential abuse by the rogue CPs. And MCMC did see that.

For the record, MCMC has stated in black-and-white to the three CEOs that it "will no longer allow PCS providers (the Celcos) or the CPs to do the short code masking for mobile content service provided by any 5-digit short code, or regular mobilephone number".

However, MCMC has a caveat in that the Celcos are allowed to mask the short code using their company name ONLY in broadcasting messages to theIr OWN SUBSCRIBERS.

Now, those were the MCMC imperatives dated April 9.

Maxis has to explain why 11 days after the MCMC directive to the three CEOs, I was still billed RM4.00 by MT&T for an SMS content dated April 20 that I didn't subscribe to nor receive on my MT?

Does Maxis know that I only have contractual service agreement with the 012 Celco. and not its external CP like MT&T?

Or the entire Celco operators network -- from the biggest to the smallest -- have openly defied MCMC despite the April 9 letter issued to their CEOs? Is MCMC really toothless?

There are accomplices to crime. Watch this space, Mr MCMC!