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• The Singapore Government had accepted Malaysia's proposal to build a half-bridge.
• The bridge was not part of the package of outstanding bilateral issues.
• The Malaysian Government was "half-past-six" and "lacked guts" by not going ahead with the crooked bridge project.
• Malaysia had put the issue of selling sand and allowing the Republic of Singapore Air Force to use its airspace on the negotiating table.
• This was only the second time in recent history that information protected by the Official Secrets Act has been cleared for public consumption — a sign of the Government's seriousness in wanting the people who voted it into power to have the full facts so as to appreciate why the Government decided to abort the bridge project.
• In the package of documents released is correspondence between Dr Mahathir and two of Singapore's former prime ministers, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong.

Also made public are extracts of the record of the meeting between Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Goh in Kuala Lumpur in March 2005.

Trawling through the documents, it is easy to establish several facts.

Fact Number One: Discussions with Singapore on the airspace issue were not new and were not mooted by the current Government under Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

Dr Mahathir himself included this issue as a trade-off and as part of the package of issues to be resolved with Singapore during negotiations from 1998 to 2002. This was evident in Dr Mahathir's letter to Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew on March 4, 2002. The same issue was raised by Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong during a meeting with Abdullah on March 1, 2005.

This nullifies the suggestion by Dr Mahathir that it was the present administration that offered RSAF jets use of Malaysian airspace.

Fact Number Two: The sale of sand to Singapore was raised by Singapore at a meeting between Abdullah and Goh on March 1, 2005. This nullifies the argument that the Malaysian Government had put the issue of sand on the negotiating table.

Fact Number Three: Comprehensive advice from the Attorney-General's Chambers showed that Malaysia could not proceed to build a bridge unilaterally because of various legal implications. In particular, Malaysia had obligations under the Johor-Singapore water agreements 1961 and 1962, the Wayleave Agreements, and the Separation Agreement 1965.

A main obstacle was the Public Utilities Board's ownership of the water pipeline on the Causeway. The A-G's Chambers said that under the 1961 and 1962 Johor-Singapore Water Agreements, "Malaysia is required to obtain the approval of the PUB in relation to the alteration of water pipelines necessitated by the construction of a bridge, whether it is a full straight bridge or a scenic bridge".

These agreements were guaranteed under the 1965 Separation Agreement, and take precedence over the Wayleave Agreements. These facts nullify the allegation that the water pipes could be relocated unilaterally on giving six months' notice to Singapore.

Taking into consideration these facts, the present Government had to make the firm decision to reject Singapore's quid-pro-quo proposal on sand and airspace, as it would have compromised Malaysia's national sovereignty. It had to make the political decision to abort the bridge project as this was consistent with the sentiments of Malaysians and the interests of Malaysia.

Concluding, the Foreign Ministry said the issue boiled down to one simple fact: Malaysia wanted the bridge and Singapore did not.

"The straight bridge proposed by Malaysia would have been a symbol of friendship and would have benefited both countries. Nevertheless, the responsibility for achieving this aim does not lie with Malaysia alone," said the ministry in a statement to Bernama.

Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad has raised several allegations on the Government's decision to abort building a bridge to replace the Causeway. Below, the Government sets out the facts and sketches the historical backdrop to this decision.

• The allegation: That the Singapore Government accepted Malaysia's proposal to build a half-bridge.

  The facts: On March 4, 2002, Dr Mahathir wrote a letter to Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew in which, among other things, he proposed to build a half-bridge to replace Malaysia's side of the Causeway.

  On April 11, 2002, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong replied and agreed to that proposal. But there were two provisos: It was conditional upon Malaysia agreeing to Singapore's suggestions on a clutch of bilateral issues — water, the Points of Agreement, the Central Provident Fund, and the use of Malaysian air space.

  Also, it was subject to further discussions at ministerial and senior officials level.

  On Oct 7, 2002, Dr Mahathir proposed to Goh that both countries discontinue discussions on the package of outstanding bilateral issues, as there appeared to be no movement in resolving the issues as a package.

  On Oct 14, 2002, Goh replied, withdrawing Singapore's agreement on the half-bridge in the context of the package and stating that its earlier agreement to the bridge project was now invalid.

  Goh wrote: "I had been prepared to make concessions in varying the POA with extra pieces of land, allowing early withdrawal of CPF deposits and building our part of the bridge to replace the Causeway at our expense as trade-offs, so that you give us airspace, and future water at a fair price...

  "Since you now want to deal with the water issue separately and discontinue the package approach, these trade-offs are no longer possible."

  In effect, this letter signalled a return to the status quo. Goh's statement was not challenged by Dr Mahathir. In fact, there was no reply to Goh's letter by Dr Mahathir.

  Singapore reiterated its position in a diplomatic note on Nov 29, 2004, while the CIQ complex in Bukit Chagar was being built. This is what it said:

  "These negotiations on a package basis were unilaterally terminated by the then Prime Minister of Malaysia Dr Mahathir Mohamad on Oct 7, 2002...With the termination of the package of negotiations, the underlying basis for the statements in the letter of April 11, 2002 no longer exists."

  Conclusion: It is incorrect to say that Singapore accepted Malaysia's proposal to build a half-bridge within its own territory.

• The allegation: That the letter from Goh on April 11, 2002 was the final commitment by the republic on the bridge proposal by Malaysia.

  The facts: During negotiations between the two countries, there was an understanding that no proposal would become final unless it was concluded in an agreement signed by leaders of Malaysia and Singapore. This was explained in a letter by Kuan Yew to Tun Daim Zainuddin on Aug 24, 2000.

The letter read: "To make it easier for us to write to each other, to test various options, all notes or letters I send to you or Mahathir, or vice-versa, will be treated as Without Prejudice: that there is no agreement until all points are agreed and signed by the two PMs."

Conclusion: It is incorrect to say that Goh had given a commitment on the bridge in his letter on April 11, 2002. There was no signed agreement between the PMs of Malaysia and Singapore on building the bridge.

• The allegation: That the bridge was not part of the package of bilateral issues.

  The facts: At first, the outstanding package of issues only covered four areas: water, Central Provident Fund, air space, and the relocation of KTM's CIQ complex in Singapore. This was agreed to by both countries in Hanoi on Dec 17, 1998.

  But later, the bridge project was inserted into the package of issues. Dr Mahathir did so in a letter to Kuan Yew on March 4, 2002, and the bridge issue became one of five issues in the package titled "The Package of Malaysia-Singapore Issues: The Malaysian Proposal".

Conclusion: Quite clearly, the bridge became part of the package of unresolved bilateral issues as a result of Dr Mahathir's letter.

• The allegation: That the Cabinet approved the plan to build the crooked bridge.

  The facts: The Cabinet was informed of the crooked bridge plan on Nov 21, 2001 and July 9, 2002. The discussion by the Cabinet under the previous administration was carried out without the tabling of a Cabinet paper, as is the procedure.

There was no input from ministries and government agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finance Ministry, the Natural Resources and Environment Ministry, the Works Ministry and the A-G's Chambers.

The only Cabinet paper was prepared in January 1997, but that was on the construction of a straight bridge, with the costs to be shared by Malaysia and Singapore.

Conclusion: Cabinet was twice informed of the plan to build a crooked bridge.

• The allegation: That the Government's decision to abort the bridge project would cause billions of ringgit in losses.

  The facts: The total cost of building the CIQ, the crooked bridge and the new KTM line across the Johor Strait was RM2.379 billion.

  At this time, the Government is still working out the compensation payment to Gerbang Perdana. But the fact is that the decision to abort the bridge was not an economic decision. Once it became clear that Malaysia could not build the bridge unilaterally or accede to Singapore's requests, calling off the plan to build the bridge was the most financially responsible decision.

  Conclusion: The cost of aborting the project will be much lower than the RM1.13 billion to build a bridge and rail link. Also, it would not have been advisable to spend RM1.13 billion on a structure and be stuck in limbo over its use.

• The allegation: That the Government of Malaysia was "half-past-six" and "lacked guts" in calling off the bridge project.

  The facts: Simply put, the Government had to make the right decision, taking into account the interests of Malaysians. It revisited the unilateral proposal by Dr Mahathir to build the crooked bridge but found that this was not an ideal solution. A crooked bridge is not a legacy to leave to future Malaysians.

  In coming to its decision to abort the bridge project, the Government studied not only the Wayleave Agreements but also the Johor-Singapore Water Agreements 1961 and 1962, and the Separation Agreement 1965, taking into consideration the advice of the Attorney-General's Chambers.

  This is what the A-G said: "The construction of the scenic half-bridge to replace the Causeway (on the Malaysian side) must be studied in a holistic manner. This is because the construction has international law implications, particularly its environmental impact on Singapore...

  "Also, the construction of the scenic half-bridge will involve the demolition of the Causeway on the Malaysian side. This will have an impact on water pipes straddling the Causeway. In this regard, legal implications from the point of view of the Johor-Singapore Water Agreements 1961 and 1962, Wayleave

  Agreements and Separation Agreement 1965 have to be looked into.

  "As a sovereign and independent country, Malaysia has the sole power and authority on its territory and other countries cannot interfere in its affairs. Nevertheless, Malaysia cannot take unilateral action without taking into account principles and requirements of international laws, which among other things, requires the rights of
  neighbours to be weighed."

  Conclusion: With so much uncertainty, it made sense for the Government to take a step back and do the right thing. Running the Government is not about scoring points or engaging in brinkmanship. It is about weighing the pros and cons and reaching a decision that is good for Malaysia.<./li>

• The allegation: That Malaysia offered its airspace and sand to Singapore.

  The facts: The issue of allowing use of Malaysian airspace had been on the negotiating table between 1998 and 2002. Dr Mahathir himself inserted this issue in a letter to Kuan Yew on March 4, 2002. He offered it as a trade-off during negotiations on the package of unresolved issues.

  Singapore used to enjoy five flight privileges until 1998. It sought all those rights to be re-instated, but the government of the day was only prepared to offer search-and-rescue and the Northern Transit Corridor rights.

  The right of search-and-rescue was offered on the basis of reciprocity and is consistent with international practice. As for Northern Transit Corridor, it only allows RSAF jets to transit over the South China Sea. The jets will not be allowed to roam Malaysian airspace.

  Conclusion: The use of Malaysian airspace was put on the table by the previous Government under Dr Mahathir.

The facts: The sale of sand was raised by Goh during a meeting with Abdullah on March 1, 2005 in Putrajaya. Singapore said this issue was important to them and that it would make selling the bridge idea to Singapore more palatable.

Remember, as far as the republic was concerned, it did not see the need for a bridge to replace the Causeway. It wanted something in return for agreeing to the bridge deal, sand and the airspace.

Knowing that Singapore only would be willing to agree to the bridge project on the basis of balance of interests, Malaysia agreed to consider the request for sand.

But once it became clear that the Malaysian public was dead set against selling any sand or allowing RSAF jets to use its airspace, the Government moved firmly and made the only acceptable decision — it aborted the plan to build the bridge.

Going ahead to satisfy the two conditions the republic put forward would have meant going against the wishes of many Malaysians.